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Keywords

wind power suppliers;uncertainty risk;conditional value at risk(CVaR);risk aversion;revenue sharing contracts

Abstract

As wind power output is highly unstable due to the uncertain environmental disturbance such as wind speed, both the wind power supplier and the power retailer in the wind power supply chain face the risks of uncertain profits. In light of this, firstly, profit‑sharing contracts are introduced under decentralized decision‑making to optimize the decision‑makings of wind power suppliers and electricity retailers. Subsequently, conditional value at risk (CVaR) is introduced as a measure of revenue level for the electricity retailer. A wind power supply chain model is built under revenue‑sharing contracts based on CVaR. Finally, under the CVaR criterion, the uncertainty of the optimal contract quantity between wind power suppliers and electricity retailers towards wind power suppliers as well as the sensitivity of the optimal towards risk aversion coefficient of electricity retailers are analyzed. The case study analysis results demonstrate that the introduction of revenue‑sharing contracts and risk aversion mechanisms can enhance the optimal contract quantity for both the wind power suppliers and electricity retailers, achieving optimal performance for the wind power supply chain under uncertain generation conditions.

DOI

10.19781/j.issn.1673-9140.2023.04.014

First Page

134

Last Page

142

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