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Keywords

electric vehicle; charging station pricing; vehicle-to-grid interaction; demand response; locational marginal price

Abstract

To address the existing challenges in the orderly scheduling of electric vehicle (EV) charging and discharging, including the insufficient characterization of dispatchable capacity, inadequate consideration of multi-agent interests, and improper pricing mechanisms for charging stations, a two-level pricing strategy for EV charging stations based on a multi-agent Stackelberg game model is proposed. Firstly, in consideration of factors influencing charging behavior, the responsiveness of EV users is assessed, and a model for predicting the dispatchable capacity of charging stations is developed. Secondly, the game relationships among various agents are discussed. According to the EV user response willingness and the theory of locational marginal pricing, a two-level pricing strategy for charging stations based on the Stackelberg game is proposed: The outer layer model is optimized to minimize the costs of distribution network operators, and the locational marginal prices at each distribution network node are set. The inner layer model is optimized to maximize the revenue of charging stations and minimize the charging costs for EV users. The pricing strategy for charging stations is established, and the charging and discharging plans are arranged by EV users according to the electricity prices. Finally, the model is reconstructed by using duality theory and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, and an iterative algorithm is designed to solve it. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed pricing strategy can increase profits for charging stations while reducing costs for EV users and the distribution network, thus balancing the interests of all agents involved.

DOI

10.19781/j.issn.1673-9140.2025.03.026

First Page

243

Last Page

254

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